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LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
Carrier's reorganization of services and routes to provide service to the United States 
government in support of Operation Desert Shield, which resulted in an unprojected stop 
in Lisbon, Portugal where damages to cargo were sustained. was not an unreasonable 
deviation sufficient to abrogate the contract of carriage and its COGSA $500-per­
package limitation. 
SNC SL.B. v. MIV Newark Bay, 111 F.3d 243 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(Decided April 2, 1997) 
This case arises out of a contract of carriage dated November 23, 1990 between defendant­
appellant Sea-Land Services, Inc. ("Sea-Land") and American Trading Industries, Inc. ("shipper") 
to transport a 37-foot yacht from Port Everglades, Florida to Marseilles, France. After the yacht 
was delivered in good condition to the carrier it was loaded onto the MN NEW ARK BAY on 
November 29, 1 990 and carried to Felixstowe, England where it was transferred to the SEA 
EAGLE, a "feeder vessel," for shipment to Marseilles. 
During this time, Sea-Land reorganized its routes to provide service to the United States 
government in support of Operation Desert Shield. As a result, Sea-Land transferred the yacht 
from the SEA EAGLE to another feeder vessel at Lisbon, Ponugal on January 3, 1991 for the 
completion of the trip to Marseilles. It was uncommon for Sea-Land to use this port because, 
unlike the nearby port of Algeciras, Spain, Sea-Land did not have facilities in Lisbon. During this 
transfer the yacht was severely damaged. 
The bill of lading for the yacht contained a "clause paramount" which incorporated by 
reference all of the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by the Sea Act (COGSA), which applies 
only to goods stowed between the decks or in the hold. However, a separate clause in the bill of 
lading applied COGSA to the stowage of the yacht above the deck, limiting Sea-Land's liability 
to $500. Plaintiff-appellee SNC S.L.B. ("SNC"), as consignee of  the yacht, and plaintiff-appellee 
Gilles Bentin, manager of SNC in Marseilles, brought this acnon against Sea-Land to recover the 
cost of the yacht claiming that the SEA EAGLE had "unreasonabiy deviat[ed] from the contract 
of carriage [by unloading the yacht at Lisbon] and the defendants are, therefore, strictly liable for 
the damage to the [yacht]. "  In response, Sea-Land denied that it had unreasonably deviated from 
the contract of carriage and that "the maximum liability of defendant, if any, is $500 per 
package .. . as agreed to in the provisions of the bill of lading and under the provisions of 
[COGSA]." 
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that Sea-Land unreasonably 
deviated from its projected route which constituted a breach of contract. The court based its 
decision on the fact that Sea-Land did not inform the plaintiff or the possibility that the yacht 
could be transferred at Lisbon. The court gave significant \veigh� to testimony given by Brian 
Fitzgibbon, Sea-Land's general manager of vessel operations �d planning for the Atlantic 
Division, who said that Lisbon had a reputation of being a "labor problem" port. The court 
deemed this testimony sufficient to declare that the port in Lisbon placed the yacht at foreseeable 
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risk during the transfer. The defendant, therefore, was found fully liable for the dru:nages sustained 
by the plaintiffs thereoy abrogating its $500 liability limitation in the contract of carriage 
On appeal, defendant contested the district court's finding that the transfer at Lisbon 
constituted an unreasonable deviation. The United States Court of Appeals will rev1ew a d!smct 
court's findings for clear error and will reverse only when left with a "firm conv1cnon that a 
mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S 364. 395. 68 
S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 LEd. 746 ( 1948). In light of this, the court first examined general mannme 
law where a vessel 15 said to "deviate" when it leaves its planned or customary course or 
itinerary. The district court found that Sea-Land had indeed deviated from its course because 
Lisbon was not a customary port for its vessels. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge thts 
finding but instead contended that its deviation was reasonable. The Coun of Appeals agreed 
It is well settled that courts will deprive a carrier of the benefit of contractual hm1tanon 
of liability for damage to goods only when a vessel unreasonably deviates from the terms of the 
contract. Italia Di Ncn·igazione. S.P.A. v. M. V Hermes I, 724 F.2d 21, 22 (2nd Cu 1983) In 
General Elec. Co. Inr'l Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 86 (2nd Cu 1983 ) . It was 
held that a "deviation is unreasonable ... when, in the absence of significant counterv;uhng factors. 
the deviation substantially increases the exposure of cargo to foreseeable dangers that would ha\·e 
been avoided had no deviation occurred." 
Holding that the deviation was in fact reasonable, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's decision. The court concluded that the evidence did not support the fmdmg that 
the yacht was placed in foreseeable and avoidable danger by its being transferred at L1sbon 
instead of at Algeciras. The court reasoned that the testimony given by Fitzgibbon explamed why 
Sea-Land did not use Lisbon as a regular port rather than that the Lisbon pen lacked competence 
to unload cargo. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence which the dtsmct court 
relied on did not support the finding that the transfer at Lisbon placed the cargo at undue nsk nor 
that the deviation to Lisbon was unreasonable. 
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PUNITJYE DAMAGES UNDER MARITIME LAW (Two C ases) 
I. Punitive damages are not available to non-seamen/non-seafarers under maritime lav.-. 
Frazer v. City of New York & Circle Line Sightseeing Yachts. Inc .. 659 KY.S.2d 23 
(A.D. 1 Dept. 1997) 
(Decided June 24, 1997) 
On May 25, 1986 a Circle Line sightseeing boat collided while on the Harlem River in 
New York with the \\.illis Avenue Bridge, allegedly causing injury to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought 
suit against both Circle Line and the City of New York for compensatory and punitive damages. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim was denied by the Supreme Coun, 
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